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Abstract
In this note, I consider a setting in which an agent can exert costly unobservable eﬀort
towards two activities and is, a priori, uncertain about its ability to perform them. A
(non-contractible) ability enhancing investment can be performed. The lack of commitment
from a Principal concerned with (informational) rent extraction, and who is in control of
both activities, induces the standard underinvestment outcome of Hold-Up problems. It
is then shown that, if the two activities are assigned to two diﬀerent Principals, ex-post
incentives will be more powerful generating, from an ex-ante perspective, higher incentives
for ability enhancing investment. The combination of higher ex-ante investments and ex-
post incentives produces an outcome that is superior than a single Principal’s outcome in
terms of eﬃciency. This suggests that organizational structure, through its inﬂuence on
the design of incentives over contractible variables, can play a key role is solving Hold-Up
problems.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the seminal works of Williamson (1985), Klein et al (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986),
and Hart and Moore (1990) among others, Economists have drawn a big deal of attention
to the study of (relationship-speciﬁc) investment decisions in a world in which contracts are
incomplete, and to means to minimize potential ineﬃciencies in those decisions.
Regarding the second point, special emphasis has been placed on the ownership of assets
as a mean to induce investment. Assets, the story goes, grants residual control rights over
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1ex-post decisions to its owner. Hence, property rights is a mean to allocate ex-post bargain
power which, by transferring ex-post surplus to one of the parties, provides incentives for ex-
ante relationship speciﬁc investment. One issue that these papers take for granted is that all
players are able to acquire the relevant assets, so the analysis focus exclusively on the surplus
maximizing assignment of ownership: property rights over assets should be granted to the side
of the market for which the investment is the most precious socially.
When — for various reasons such as credit constraints, limited liability, risk aversion, among
others — the acquisition of assets is not feasible, one must consider alternative mechanisms to
curb potential ineﬃcient decisions in an incomplete contract world. Aghion and Bolton (1992),
for example, suggest that in such case debt ﬁnancing can work as a mechanism to allocate
contingent control, inducing optimal decisions in states of bankruptcy.
Even if feasible, the granting property rights to one of the sides in a relationship necessarily
reduces the other side’s incentives to invest. In fact, this is what Grossman and Hart (1986),
and Hart and Moore (1990) have pointed out as the main cost of vertical integration. It
seems, therefore, that additional mechanisms should be sought to trim the resulting reduction
in investment from the side of the party without propiertoship of assets.
In searching for an additional mechanism to stimulate relationship-speciﬁc investments, this
note follows a somewhat similar path to the one in Aghion and Bolton (1992). I argue that
an organizational structure within a ﬁrm, through its eﬀect on the design of incentive schemes
over contractible variables, serve as a mean to provide incentives for ex-ante investments in a
situation in which the acquisition of assets is not feasible. In cases the unrestricted acquisition
of assets is feasible an adequate organization structure may play a complementary role to the
one played by ownership.
I analyze a setting in which an agent can exert costly unobservable eﬀort towards two
activities and is, ap r i o r i , uncertain about its ability to perform them. A non-contractible
ability enhancing investment can be performed. The lack of commitment from a Principal
concerned with (informational) rent extraction, and who is in control of both activities, induces
the standard underinvestment outcome of Hold-Up problems. It is then shown that, if the
two activities are assigned to two diﬀerent Principals, ex-post incentives will be more powerful
generating, from an ex-ante perspective, higher incentives for ability enhancing investment. The
combination of higher ex-ante investments and ex-post incentives produces an outcome that is
2superior than a single Principal’s outcome in terms of eﬃciency.
The reason why incentives are steeper in a dual structure is simple: the Principals have to
compete for the agent’s attention. This competition between Principals transfers some of the
ex-post surplus to the agent, who then faces, from an ex-ante perspective, better incentives to
invest. One sees that the mechanism through which eﬃciency gains can be attained in this
note’s setting is exactly analogous to the one implied by the Property Rights Theory. In fact,
an organizational structure with more than one Principal can be seen as a credible way to
commit to not extracting ex-post surplus from the investing party, much as the proprietorship
of an asset guarantees to its owner participation in the ex-post surplus.1
This note is organized as follows. The next section describes the set-up of the model, and
the timing of events. Section 3 solves the model for the two diﬀerent organizational structures
and compares their eﬀects on the relevant variables. Section 4 discusses the results, and draws
a brief conclusion. All results not in the text can be found in the appendix.
2M o d e l
The players in the model are an agent who can exert unobservable costly eﬀort towards the
production of two activities, i =1 ,2, and either one or two principals to which this agent report.
In this note, we analyze two diﬀerent organizational arrangements. In the ﬁrst one, a single
Principal is in charge of both activities, while in the second a diﬀerent Principal is in charge.
Attached to activity i =1 ,2 is a contractible output
yi = θ + ei,
1The practical diﬀerence between the two mechanisms can be signiﬁcant however. Consider, for example, the
case in which a middle manager in a large corporation can, by incurring some cost, specialize himself in a task
that contributes to two diﬀerent businesses of the corporation he works for. If such task is speciﬁc to the way this
company manages its businesses (e.g., refers to a market that the company is the only one that has access to),
the usual underinvestment outcome takes place. To solve this problem, the Property Rights Theory suggests that
the middle manager should take over the relevant businesses, which may be, for a myriad of reasons, infeasible.
The note suggests that an improvement can be attained by simply assigning two diﬀerent bosses — one for each
of the businesses — for the manager. While this can generate some obvious organizational costs (as, for example,
it calls for diﬀerent persons in charge of diﬀerent but closely related areas), this is clearly a very practical way
to provide incentives for speciﬁc investment. If the speciﬁc investment is very important, the beneﬁts will oﬀset
the costs.
3where θ is a a measure of the agent’s ability to perform the activities 1 and 2,a n dei ≥ 0 is
am e a s u r eo ft h ea g e n t ’ se ﬀort towards activity i. The agent’s ability is ap r i o r iunknown to
all the players. More speciﬁcally, θ i sa s s u m e dt ob ed i s t r i b u t e da c c o r d i n gt oac . d . f .F(.) over




The agent, however, can — before engaging in production — invest to enhance its ability
to perform the activities. Such investment is assumed to be observable by all parts but both
non-contractible and relationship-speciﬁc: it does not aﬀect the agent’s outside option. The
i n v e s t m e n ti sa s s u m e dt om a k ei tm o r el i k e l yt h a tt he realization of the agent’s ability to perform
activities 1 and 2 is high. More speciﬁcally, I assume that for any two levels of investments
z ≥ z>z 0 ≥ 0, 2
f(θ|z)
f(θ|z0)
is increasing in θ so that higher realizations of ability are more likely if the agent invests more.
To invest z, the agent incurs a private cost of z2






where t is the total payment the Principals make to him. Note that the two types of eﬀort are
substitutes in the agent’s preferences. This will be key for the results to follow.
A single Principal is assumed to care about the sum of proﬁts generated by both activities
while in the case there are two Principals, each of them is assumed to care solely about the
proﬁts generated by the activity they control. The timing of events is depicted in Picture 1. At
time zero, the agent performs the relationship-speciﬁc investment. At period 1, he learns his
ability and, in the one-Principal case, the set of contracts {y1,y 2,t(y1,y 2)}y1,y2.i s o ﬀered to
the agent and he selects the contract that ﬁts him better. In case there are two principals, two
sets of contracts, {y1,t 1(y1)}y1 and {y2,t 2(y2)}y2 are oﬀered. The agent must contract with
both principals, i.e., the model is one of intrinsic common agency (Bernheim and Whinston
(1986)). In period 2, he chooses privately the level of eﬀorts towards production, and the level
of production realizes. All payments are made in accordance in period 3.
2It a k et h a tf(θ|0) = f(θ).
4Figure 1 Here
3 The One Principal Case
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2 , ∀θ,b θ (IC).
In words, his proﬁt maximization problem is constrained by the fact that, no matter what
is the realization of the agent’s ability, the principal has to match the agent’s outside option
(IR). It must also be the case that the agent is better oﬀ reporting his true ability rather than
any other one to the Principal (IC).4 An application of the Envelope Theorem (Milgrom and
Segal, 2002) along with a single crossing condition that the agent’s utility satisﬁes allows one






2 (τ) − 2τ)dτ, (1)
and y1P
1 (θ)+y1P











2 (τ) − 2τ)dτ.
Substituting this in the objective function, integrating by parts, and noting that participation is

















3Here I use the fact that ei = yi − θ, and normalize the agents outside option to zero.
4Note that I make use of the Relevation Principle.
5s.t. U(θ) ≥ 0,y P
1 (θ)+yP
2 (θ) non-decreasing in θ.




2 + θ −
(1−F(θ|z))
f(θ|z) . Compared with an eﬃcient outcome5, one sees that
to minimize the rents left to the agent, the Principal distorts downward the required level
of output. This is a standard feature of models with asymmetric information., what is non-
standard in the model is that such distortion ex-post aﬀects the ex-ante incentives for the agent
to invest.
More speciﬁcally, at period 0, anticipating the Principal’s choice of outputs and, conse-























It is clear that, due to the ex-post downward distortion of output, the agent cannot fully rip
the beneﬁts of his investment and therefore underinvests (compared to what is socially optimal)
so that the standard Hold-Up problem ensues.
4T w o - P r i n c i p a l C a s e
With two Principals, matters are slightly more complicated in period 1. The main source of
complication is the fact the Revelation principle does not apply in a common agency setting.
However, as shown by Martimort and Stole (2002), an extension of the Taxation Principle
(see, Salanie, 1997) — the Delegation Principle —, applies and the whole equilibrium set can be
computed using a fairly simple methodology.
The main idea is to consider individually each of the principal’s problem for a ﬁxed set of
contracts oﬀered by the other. In such case, under some assumptions that have to be checked
5Eﬃciency here requires that, for any z,
y1(θ)+y2(θ)=1+2 θ.
6in equilibrium, the methodology used in the single board case fully applies and the problem
reads exactly as a single principal’s one. More speciﬁcally, let {y2 (z),t 2(y2 (z))}y2 be a ﬁxed
set of contracts oﬀered by the second Principal for a given level of investment by the agent.
The agent will choose among them the one that maximizes his utility. As a consequence, it is
as if Principal 1 had to deal with an agents with preferences given by
t1(y1)+φ(y1,z,θ), (3)
where φ(y1,z,θ)=m a x y2 t2(y2 (z))−1
2 [y1 + y2 (z)) − 2θ]
2 . Therefore, for a ﬁxed set of contracts
oﬀered by Principal 2, Principal 1’s problem is exactly the same as the one of a single principal
deciding only on y1 and facing an agent with preferences described by (2) In particular, the
Revelation Principle fully applies in such a case and attention can be restricted to Direct
Mechanisms of the form {y1(b θ),t 1(b θ)}b θ.
Deﬁning Φ(θ)=m a x b θ t1(y1(b θ)+φ(y1(b θ),θ), and using the Envelope Theorem, incentive




2[y1(τ)+y2(y1(τ),z,τ) − 2τ]dτ (4)
and
dy1(θ)
dθ ≥ 0. It is important to notice that the single crossing condition (φθy1 ≥ 0) needed to
replace the incentive compatibility constraints by the above two conditions is now endogenous:
it depends on the set of contracts oﬀered by Principal 2, and has to be checked in equilibrium.
Ignoring this issue for now, and proceeding exactly in the same fashion as before (i.e., integrating
condition (3) by parts and substituting t1(θ) in the objective function, as well as imposing
Φ(θ)=0as it minimizes the payments to the agent and guarantees the satisfaction of the






(y1 + y2(y1,z,θ) − 2θ).
The ﬁrst order necessary condition for optimality is given by







The problem for Principal 2 is analogous and yields a similar ﬁrst order condition. In a








6For a derivation, see the appendix.
7symmetric equilibrium solves the diﬀerential equation











with boundary condition y2P(θ,z)=1
2 + θ. The convexity of the agent’s cost in exerting eﬀort
implies that outputs for activity 1 and 2 are substitutes in his preferences, i.e.,
dy2(y1,θ)
dy1 < 0.
This particular feature, as shown by Martimort (1992) has as an important implication
Proposition 1 (Martimort (1992) For any given z ∈ [0,z], there is a unique Symmetric Equi-
librium in the subgame played by the Principals. Such equilibrium is the solution of











with boundary condition y2P(θ,z)=1
2 + θ.
In addition to the uniqueness result in Proposition 1, the substitutability of outputs in the
agent’s preferences has also another important implication. From (4), one can see that, when
deciding on his output target, Principal 1 perceives the reduction in the output that the agent
will be demanded from Principal 2,
dy2(y1,z,θ)
dy1 , as an additional beneﬁt. One then has
Proposition 2 For any given z ∈ [0,z] and activity i =1 ,2, the output demanded from the
agent in a dual structure, y2P
i , will be strictly higher than in a unitary structure, y1P
i .
4.1 Investments Decisions in a Two-Principal Case
Proposition 2 implies that, from an ex-post perspective, the output will be closer to the ﬁrst
best in a common agency set-up. As a consequence, since the agent’s informational rents are
increasing in the demanded output, the result also implies that, for any given level of investment
z, the agents’ ex-post utility will be strictly higher in a two-principal arrangement. It seems,
therefore, that, in principle, the agent faces steeper incentives upon deciding to invest and,
consequently, picks a higher z in a dual structure.
This argument, however, ignores the eﬀect of the agents choice of investment in the outputs
themselves. A higher investment, by enhancing the agent’s ability, makes it more likely that a
high θ is drawn. Therefore, for any given θ, ah i g h e rz increases the likelihood that a Principal is
facing a type higher than θ. The provision of informational rents to the agent becomes costlier,
and, therefore, output is reduced.
8As it turns out, this (perverse) eﬀect of a higher investment on ex-post output is more
critical in an unitary structure. The reason why this is the case is again the fact that outputs
are substitutes in the agent’s preferences. Each Principal anticipates that a higher z will lead
to a reduction in the output demanded from the other Principal. Hence, in response to such
eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nz, the Principals reduces their output in a less aggressive fashion when
compared to an unitary structure. It then follows
Proposition 3 T h ea g e n tw i l li n v e s tm o r ei nas e t t i n gi nw h i c hh er e p o r t st ot w oP r i n c i p a l s .
Hence, making the agent report to two Principals strictly improves eﬃciency by both increasing
the demanded targets and by inducing more investment from the agent.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This note aimed to argue that, if one wants to stimulate relationship-speciﬁc investment, not
only the assignment of property rights over assets but also the design of the organizational
structure within a ﬁrm is of relevance in instances of contractual incompleteness. A well de-
signed organizational structure, through its impact on the design of incentives over contractible
variables, determines the parties’ ex-post participation in the total surplus, which in turn aﬀect
incentives for ex-ante investment.
The results are: an organizational structure in which the agent reports to two principals
results in (i) more output being demanded from the agent for a given level of investment, (ii) a
lower sensitivity of the principal’s choice of output to changes in the speciﬁc-investment made
by the agent, and, as a consequence of (i) and (ii), (iii) higher incentives for the agent to invest
in the relationship.
An interpretation of those results is that, through some competition between its diﬀerent
sections, an organization may be able to credibly “bring the market inside the ﬁrm”, and make
some types of relationship-speciﬁc investments — i.e., those that do not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the
agent’s outside option — less speciﬁc from the point of view of whom takes the decision to invest.
While there are well known limitations to trying to replicate the market’s functioning inside a
ﬁrm — such as the fact that some of the incentives inside an organization have to be self-enforced
(Baker et al (2001, 2002)), and that part of decisions are authority-based (Simon (1951), Aghion
and Tirole (1988)) — , an organizational structure that assigns diﬀerent Principals to diﬀerent
9activities partly accomplishes this task. This may serve as a mean to provide incentives for
ex-ante investments in situations in which either the unrestricted acquisition of assets — the
remedy for the Hold-Up problem suggested the Property Rights Theory — is not feasible, or
two-sided speciﬁc investments are important.
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6A p p e n d i x
This appendix derives ﬁr s ta ne x p r e s s i o nf o r
dy2(y1,θ)
d1 when evaluated at the equilibrium, and
proves Proposition 3.
Toward accomplishing the former, note that the ﬁrst order condition for maxy2 t2(y2) −
1
2 [y1 + y2 − 2θ]
2 reads
t0
2(y2) − [y1 + y2 − 2θ]=0 . (6)






















y(θ) and we have the expression in the text.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : To show the result, one just needs, evoking Topkis (1998),
to show that the objective function of the following parameterized program has an objective


















4[y2P(θ,z) − y1P(θ,z)][1 − F(θ|z)]dθ]dθ














The ﬁrst term is unambiguously positive as y2P(θ,z) >y 1P(θ,z) for all θ ∈ [θ,θ), and




























































and the result follows.¥
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